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Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship between the US current account deficit, the international value 
of the dollar, and the dollar reserves of foreign central banks.  We find that the international 
value of the dollar impacts the US current account and also that dollar depreciations are 
accompanied by reductions in the inflow of foreign reserves.  The inflow reductions are 
indicative that the US levies an exchange rate tax on foreigners because the foreign stock of 
reserves loses value. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The United States’ current account (CA) deficit has been on the rise since 1991.  If that trend 
persists, net income payments may reach 4.5 percent of GDP while the trade deficit can be of 
only 1.5 percent of GDP (Truman 2005).  Holding the trade deficit constant would require an 
increasing CA deficit because of the growing net investment income payments. 
Indeed, the deficit is financed by foreign capital inflows.  From 2000 to 2002 the latter 
declined but this did not reduce the CA deficit, as private capital outflows also shrank and 
official inflows rose.  To sustain exchange rate pegs and thus prevent their currencies from 
appreciating, Asian central banks buy Treasury bonds in large quantities.  About ¾ of the total 
of foreign dollar reserves are held by the Asian banks including the Bank of Japan as well as 
the oil-exporting countries that put some of their extra revenues into dollar-denominated 
assets and treasuries. 
The CA deficit means growing foreign ownership of US capital stock and increasing 
US net debt to foreigners.  Arguably these cannot grow limitless.  Servicing a larger debt 
demands higher borrowing or higher net exports.  But while the latter requires a dollar fall, 
debt service is not likely to become burdensome.  Despite the fact that the US is a net debtor, 
US net investment income has remained positive.  This is because US holdings of foreign 
assets have earned a higher rate of return than US debt owed to foreigners (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2005b). 
The deficit can be mutually beneficial in that it allows the lender to enjoy a higher rate 
of return than the home rate, and allows the borrower to operate with a larger capital stock 
than that financed only from domestic savings.  As the investments yield a high enough rate 
of return to service the debt, borrowing should not reduce future domestic income.  So the CA 
deficit did not prevent the American economy to grow above three percent on average.  Yet 
the deficit can have both positive and negative effects on the economy.  Production of exports 
and import-competing goods becomes lower, but interest rates get also lower than in the 
absence of foreign capital inflows.  And low interest rates can explain the high investment, the 
housing boom, and the big consumption of durables, such as cars and appliances. 
So-called O’Neil doctrine has it that the CA deficit does not matter.  The deficit would 
be a sign of America’s strength.  As US assets yield a higher (risk-adjusted) rate of return than 
foreign assets, rational investors will find US assets attractive.  Fed chairman Ben Bernanke 
(2005) believes that foreigners will continue to increase their holding of US assets because of 
a global savings glut.  A big thrift shift has been provoked precisely by the emerging 
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economies, which have become net lenders and no longer net borrowers.  Bernanke thus 
believes that neither profligate consumers nor the government budget deficit are the primary 
cause of the CA deficit. 
Yet as much of the foreign borrowing is not being used to expand US productive 
capacity, such borrowing may not enhance US ability to service the foreign debt.  Americans 
may be forced to eventually raise their savings (i.e. reduce consumption) and cut the 
government deficit.  Alan Greenspan once warned that there must be a limit for foreigners to 
hold dollar based assets; and this can be extended to the dollar reserves held by the central 
banks of emerging markets.  Some at the IMF also fear that the CA deficit is unsustainable 
and that it posits the number one risk to the world economy. 
A slow decline in the dollar and CA deficit is not necessarily bad (Labonte 2005 gives 
a review).  A slow reduction can be expansionary in the short run in that augmented net 
exports impact more aggregate demand than reduce investment.  And this seems to receive 
support from the international experience of current account deficit reduction (Labonte 2005).  
However, a serious problem would be triggered if foreigners suddenly decided to either 
reduce the fraction of their savings that goes to the US as capital inflows or repatriate part of 
their liquid capital.  The initial effect would be sharp and large dollar depreciation and US 
interest rate increase.  Sky-high interest rates would lower the market value of debt securities, 
cause prices on stockmarkets to fall, and generate insolvency of debtors (DeLong 2005).  And 
the dollar fall would harm standards of living because it would raise the price of imports to 
households, i.e. the terms of trade would decline.   Were the Asian central banks to reduce 
their demand for dollars, Roubini and Setser (2004) estimate that US interest rates would 
grow by two percentage points. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) also think that the CA deficit is due to low domestic 
savings and high foreign savings, and that a dollar slide ought to result from an eventual 
adjustment.  They forecast a 20 percent dollar fall in the event of a gradual reduction of the 
CA deficit, and an above 40 percent fall amid a sharp reduction.  A weaker dollar is 
commonly thought to dampen the CA deficit through export growth.  Yet Obstfeld and 
Rogoff observe that a drop in domestic savings would provoke a reduction in both tradable 
and nontradable goods.  To prevent unemployment, nontradable consumption had to be 
encouraged and this would require the dollar fall to mean a relative fall in nontradable prices. 
Two main forces have contributed to worsen the CA deficit, namely (1) growing 
imports (due in part to persistent GDP growth) and shrinking US exports, and (2) excessive 
demand for dollars from the part of the Asian central banks (Blanchard et al 2005).  These 
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have scant interest in a weaker dollar because of their dollar holdings.  Riggins and Klitgaard 
(2004) and Roubini and Setser (2004) predict that an appreciation of the Thai baht, the 
Korean won, and the Chinese yuan would depress those countries’ GDPs.  As for the effect on 
the dollar, the Chinese revaluation of the yuan in July 2005 (that ended an eleven year-old 
peg) seems to partly explain the dollar slide from April 2006 on.  This has been largely 
anticipated (Blanchard et al 2005). 
Some estimates using international data find that when CA deficits reach five percent 
of GDP, the exchange rate starts depreciating and the CA begins to react (Freund 2004).  
Given that the US CA deficit is already above this threshold, a CA account recovery is 
overdue.  Yet a dollar slide is on the way. 
The US can afford to run such a gigantic CA deficit thanks to its privilege of owing its 
debt in its own currency and receiving payments in their creditors’ currency.  Dollar 
depreciations soften the burden of the deficit and tend to increase US net wealth.  The dollar’s 
unique role explains why US investments abroad perform better than foreign investments in 
the US.  US liabilities are all dollar-denominated while 70 percent of holdings of nonresident 
assets are denominated in the other countries’ currencies.  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a) 
argue that financial globalization makes debt relief through the exchange rate more important 
than through the trade balance.  They reckon that, between 2002 and 2004, more than 75 
percent of the growth of US foreign debt provoked by the CA deficit was offset by changes in 
the value of nonresident assets thanks to the dollar decline. 
This can be thought of an “exchange rate tax”.  An analogy with the inflation tax 
(related to the domestic value of a currency) can be here straightforward.  One can think of 
the exchange rate tax related to the international value of the dollar.  The US benefits from a 
dollar fall as dollar-denominated assets held by foreign investors and central banks lose value.  
There is “international seignorage” and the “revenues” coming from dollar depreciations are 
similar to an exchange rate tax levied on US creditors.  The US has a flexible exchange rate 
regime and so does not have to defend its currency with foreign exchange reserves.  But while 
the Fed has no explicit exchange rate policy, it still benefits from dollar depreciations. 
Yet persistent dollar falls may threaten the greenback’s role as a store of value, 
medium of exchange, and unit of account.  To escape the exchange rate tax, foreign investors 
and central banks might wish to diversify their reserve portfolios and increase their demands 
for yen or euro (for instance).  There are even signs that this begins actually to happen and 
that returns over investments in the European Union and Japan start to outperform those in the 
US.  While hyperinflation may result from inflation tax growth, an ever-increasing dollar 
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supply combined with shrinking demand can (theoretically at least) lead to a dollar hyper-
depreciation and the end of the dollar role as world reserve currency. 
How deep a dollar slide ought to be to balance the US CA?  Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2004) estimate a depreciation of the dollar between 14.7 and 33.6 percent if the CA deficit 
were eliminated by a change in aggregate demand, and between 9.8 and 25.5 percent if 
eliminated by a change in the supply of tradable goods.  The depreciation would have to be so 
large because about ¾ of US GDP is nontradable.  Blanchard et al (2005) estimate that a 15 
percent decline in the greenback would be associated with a reduction in the CA deficit equal 
to 1.4 percent of GDP.  Stabilizing the net debt to GDP ratio at current levels would require 
the dollar to immediately depreciate by 56 percent and the CA deficit to decline to 0.75 
percent of GDP.  If foreigners decide to reduce their holdings of US assets, they estimate a 
large, though gradual, depreciation.  Edwards (2005) employs a model similar to Blanchard et 
al’s but finds faster declines in the dollar and CA deficit.  Thus there is wide dispersion of 
estimates on the dollar depreciation related to a fall in the CA deficit.  This is partly because 
of lack of a consensus exchange rate model that performs well empirically (Labonte 2005). 
The aim of this paper is to assess the exchange rate tax, i.e. to what extent dollar 
depreciations are accompanied by reductions in the inflow of foreign reserves.  Section 2 
presents data.  Section 3 performs analysis.  And Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
We examine whether the assumption of an exchange rate tax levied by the US can receive 
support from both annual and quarterly data from 1973 to 2005.  We took inflows of net 
foreign official assets to the US and divided them by the US GDP (both series are from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis).  The quarterly ratio was then annualized.  Taking only the 
foreign official reserves rather than the entire capital account underestimates potential US 
gains and loss.  Yet this has been done thanks to the availability of data to us.  We also took a 
trade-weighted real exchange-rate series for the US from the Federal Reserve website; here 
we took natural logarithms and got either the annual series or the quarterly series by averaging 
monthly data.  We finally took world GDP in logs from the WTO website.  Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of the three series.  Note that net foreign assets per GDP are more 
volatile than the real exchange rate. 
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3. Analysis 
 
Table 2 presents ADF unit root tests with a constant.  Net foreign asset inflows per GDP and 
world GDP are nonstationary in levels but get stationary in first differences.  The real 
exchange rate is stationary. 
 There is no Granger causality between the first differences of both net foreign assets 
per GDP and real exchange rate.  The I(1) variables (net foreign asset inflows per GDP and 
world GDP) do not cointegrate, thus suggesting the absence of stable relationship between the 
variables in the long run.  We then run regressions (sample: 1976−2005) with the stationary 
variables, namely the real exchange rate and the first differences of both net foreign assets per 
GDP and world GDP.  After beginning with two lags and dropping the nonsignificant ones, 
we got the ultimate model for the dependent variable, i.e. the first differences of net foreign 
asset inflows per GDP (Table 3).  Results show well behaved residuals.  Changes in the 
inflow of assets as a proportion of GDP occurring in one year are almost reverted in the 
subsequent two years.  Thus real appreciations of the dollar are related to less foreign inflows, 
but these relate positively to the previous year’s real exchange rate.  Because a dollar 
appreciation in a given year will lead to higher inflows in the next year, but also to a reduction 
in the inflows in the appreciation’s year, this translates into active reserve management 
aiming at minimizing losses.  Changes in foreign inflows to the US are quite sensitive to 
world GDP changes, but only with a lag of two years.  Higher world GDP reduces the inflows 
of assets to the US two years later.  A strong dollar raises the gains over the current stock, 
increases portfolio values in local currencies, and causes the inflows to shrink.  Thus the 
international price of the dollar influences the dynamics of foreign official dollar reserves in 
the short run, but is almost neutral in the long run.  This suggests that the real exchange rate 
presents a greater impact on the US CA in its path toward the balance of payments 
equilibrium. 
The quarterly data show the same picture.  Table 4 shows the ADF unit root tests with 
a constant.  Net foreign official asset inflows to the US as a share of GDP are now stationary 
whereas (the log of) the real exchange rate is stationary in first differences. 
 Table 5 shows the regression output for the sample 1973Q4–2006Q4.  We begin with 
four lags and drop the nonsignificant ones.  There is a significant constant and also a positive 
relationship of the inflows with their first and third lags.  Thus the possibility of active foreign 
reserve management detected on the annual data is confirmed by the quarterly data. 
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Summing up, our regressions show that dollar depreciations are accompanied by a 
reduction in the inflow of foreign asset reserves.  The inflow reductions confirm that the US 
profits because the current foreign stock of reserves is worth less, thus suggesting the 
existence of an exchange rate tax.  (The one-year lagged inflow reversion can be in part 
explained by active money management.  But while the latter is confined to the inflows, the 
depreciation affects the overall stock.) 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
We examine the US CA deficit, the dollar behavior, and its role as world currency.  We find 
that the international value of the dollar impacts the US CA, and that dollar depreciations are 
accompanied by reductions in the inflow of foreign asset reserves.  The inflow reductions 
confirm that the US levies an exchange rate tax on foreigners in that the foreign stock of 
reserves loses value. 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements. SDS acknowledges support from the Brazilian agencies CNPq and 
Capes-Procad, and GM acknowledges financial support from Capes-Daad. 
 9
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, annual data 
 
Statistic US Net Foreign 
Assets/GDP 
US Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate World GDP 
Mean 0.758120 4.580790 4.299649 
Median 0.559699 4.560000 4.353621 
Maximum 3.311069 4.809374 4.736036 
Minimum −0.533102 4.462857 3.827925 
Standard Deviation 0.791882 0.091385 0.270548 
Coefficient of Variation 1.044534 0.01995 0.062923 
 
 
 
Table 2. ADF unit root tests, annual data 
 
Variable 
 
5% t critical 
value 
1% t critical 
value 
t stat Prob. 
US Net Foreign Assets/GDP −2.954021 −3.646342 −2.650845 0.0934 
US Net Foreign Assets/GDP (First Differences) −2.960411 −3.661661 −5.838940 0.0000 
US Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate −2.957110 −3.653730 −2.962309 0.0494 
World GDP −2.960411 −3.661661 −1.037190 0.7272 
World GDP (First Differences) −2.960411 −3.661661 −3.309557 0.0231 
 
 
 
Table 3. Regression output for the model with the first differences of net foreign assets per 
GDP as the dependent variable, annual data 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Value t-Prob. 
First Differences of Net Foreign Assets per GDP (−1) −0.453504 0.1662 −2.73 0.011 
First Differences of Net Foreign Assets per GDP (−2) −0.564205 0.1551 −3.64 0.001 
Real Exchange Rate −8.98749 2.257 −3.98 0.001 
Real Exchange Rate (−1) 9.20545 2.278 4.04 0.000 
First Differences of World GDP (−2) −31.0455 9.998 −3.11 0.005 
 
R-squared 0.532891 
Adjusted R-squared 0.458154 
RSS 8.51010297 
Log-likelihood −23.669 
DW 2.01 (number of observations: 30) 
Mean(First Diff. Net Foreign Assets/GDP) 0.039090 
Var(First Diff. Net Foreign Assets/GDP)       0.607289 
AR 1-2 test F(2,23) = 0.76315 [0.4776] 
ARCH 1-1 test F(1,23) = 0.11242 [0.7404]   
Normality test  2χ (2) = 1.4190 [0.4919] 
Hetero test F(10,14) = 1.1369 [0.4020] 
Hetero-X test not enough observations 
RESET test F(1,24) = 0.20550 [0.6544] 
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Table 4. ADF unit root tests, quarterly data 
 
Variable 
 
5% t critical 
value 
1% t critical 
value 
t stat Prob. 
US Net Foreign Assets/GDP −3.480038 −2.883239 −3.083127 0.0302
US Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate −3.479656 −2.883073 −1.828296 0.3655
US Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate (First 
Differences) −3.479656 −2.883073 −9.228269 0.0000
 
 
 
Table 5. Regression output for the model with the net foreign assets per GDP as the 
dependent variable, quarterly data 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Value t-Prob. 
Constant 0.333416 0.09909 3.36 0.001 
US Net Foreign Assets/GDP (−1) 0.304873 0.07057 4.32 0.000 
US Net Foreign Assets/GDP (−3) 0.298156 0.07105 4.20 0.000 
First Differences of the Real Exchange Rate −17.5520 3.280 −5.35 0.000 
 
R-squared 0.418702 
Adjusted R-squared 0.405183 
RSS 94.1343349 
F(3,129) 30.97 [0.000]** 
Log-likelihood −165.735 
DW 2.16 (number of observations: 133) 
Mean(Net Foreign Assets/GDP) 0.806875 
Var(Net Foreign Assets/GDP) 1.21758 
AR 1-5 test F(5,124) = 0.80055 [0.5513] 
ARCH 1-4 test F(4,121) = 1.3548 [0.2537] 
Normality test 2χ (2) = 4.6579 [0.0974] 
Hetero test F(6,122) = 2.8103 [0.0135]* 
Hetero-X test F(9,119) = 2.9899 [0.0030]** 
RESET test F(1,128) = 0.80980 [0.3699] 
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